to advance and rebut claims, and to embroil all concerned in an intricate legal game."
A closer examination of the cases involving Japan reveals some of the reasons behind this critical self-appraisal by the Japanese trade officials. Table 2 shows the cases in which Japan has been the complaining party. There have been ten distinct cases (counting the two complaints in the Indonesia Auto case as one), out of which eight went to the panel/Appellate Body stage.
The following is a brief overview of these eight cases.
a. Indonesia -Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry (WT/DS55 and WT/DS64)
This was a complaint regarding the "National Car Program" announced by the Indonesian Government in February 1996. While Japan had a substantive, as well as systemic, interest in this case as the major exporter of automobiles and auto parts to the Indonesian market, the situation was hardly unique to Japan. Major automobile exporters to Indonesia, i.e., Japan, EC and the United States, coordinated their positions before filing formal complaints with the WTO.
Indeed, the first complaint regarding this measure was filed by the EC, with the request for consultations dated 3 October 1997 (WT/DS54/1). Japan's request for consultations followed on the next day (WT/DS55/1). The U.S. request was dated 8 October 1997 (WT/DS59/1). Japan filed the second request for consultations on 29 November 1997 (WT/DS64/1), but this was due to technical reasons. Thus, the complaints by the EC, Japan and the United States were filed almost simultaneously and as a result, a single panel was established to hear the three complaints.
What is noteworthy about the sequence of these events is that Japan was not the first WTO member to seek adjudication by the dispute settlement mechanism in this case. Rather, it opted for coordinating its action with the EC and the United States, and waited until the EC filed -4 -its complaint. 7 Japan's involvement in the panel process was also well-coordinated with the two other co-complainants. The panel found that Indonesia was in violation of the rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), inter alia, on most-favored-nation treatment and tariff bindings. Indonesia did not appeal the case and the panel report was adopted on 23 July 1998. Because of the Asian economic crisis of 1997-1998 and the collapse of the Suharto regime, Indonesia had to abandon its national car program. Thus, the complaining parties did not face the issue of implementation of the panel's recommendations.
b. United States -Measure Affecting Government Procurement (WT/DS95)
This complaint was about a Massachusetts state law enacted on 25 June 1996, which provided that public authorities of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts were not allowed to procure goods or services from any persons who did business with Burma (Myanmar). Clearly, this was an EC-led complaint. The EC alleged that this legislation was violating the rules of the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) and requested consultations with the United States on 20 June 1997 (WT/DS88/1). Japan filed its own complaint based on similar allegations on 18
July 1997 (WT/DS95/1). In October 1998, a single panel was established to hear the two complaints. While the panel hearing was in progress, a domestic lawsuit was initiated in the United
States regarding the constitutionality of this law. Ultimately, in a June 2000 decision, the U.S.
Supreme Court found the Massachusetts law to be unconstitutional. 8 In view of these developments, on 10 February 1999, the complainants requested the panel to suspend the panel proceedings. Pursuant to Article 12.12 of the DSU, the authority for establishment of the panel lapsed as of 11 February 2000. However, as the Massachusetts law was declared null and void by 7 The Daily Yomiuri (October 3, 1996) , based on a Kyodo News story, reported that then Chief Cabinet Secretary Seiroku Kajiyama said "Japan, the United States and European countries are likely to unite to try to persuade Indonesia to drop its policy, which they say discriminates against industrialized countries." the U.S. judiciary, the complainants were satisfied with the outcome of this case. In many respects, this case is similar to the Indonesia Auto case described above.
However, unlike the Indonesia Auto case, it was Japan that initiated the complaint. This was probably because of the pressure from the Japanese auto companies invested in Canada that were not benefiting from the Auto Pact scheme (Toyota and Honda in particular). Despite one Japanese company (Suzuki) being a beneficiary of the Auto Pact scheme, the Japanese Government decided to go ahead with this case. Since the interests of the Japanese car manufacturers were split, the 
i. Overview of Cases
The discussion above reveals that in six out of the eight cases that reached the panel/appellate stage, Japan was either a co-complainant of the EC or a part of the joint complaints led by the EC. Only in the Hot-rolled Steel case (WT/DS184) and the Sunset Review case (WT/DS244), did Japan act alone. In a broader context, even the Sunset Review case could be regarded as part of the joint efforts led by the EC (WT/DS213), and followed by Argentina (WT/DS268) and Mexico (WT/DS282) in challenging the U.S. practice regarding the sunset review of anti-dumping and countervailing duties.
Another characteristic of Japan's WTO dispute settlement strategy is geographic concentration of respondents. As shown in Table 1 , the United States has been the prime target of Japan's complaints (7 out of 11). In the eight cases reviewed above, the United States was the respondent in six cases. The EC has never been the target of Japan's complaints. Japan files a formal complaint with the WTO, it is determined to pursue the case all the way to the end. The primary aim is to seek third-party adjudication and not to extract bilateral concessions. This could be the reason for the relatively small number of complaints filed by Japan, in contrast to the United States and the EC.
The picture that emerges from the above analysis is not necessarily an aggressive user of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. Rather, it is a country that resorts to surgical strikes on selected targets (usually the United States) under a powerful cover of the EC.
A similar analysis could be attempted regarding cases where Japan has been the -14 -responding party. 9 However, Japan's reaction in those cases naturally tends to be reactive and it is difficult to find a discernible pattern. Probably it is not very useful in the analysis of Japan's aggressive legalism. Ahn (2003) Japan under the WTO dispute settlement system, after initiated by positive determination under the Section 301 proceeding, substantially strengthened the Japanese government's position concerning its domestic trade policies. Typically, Japan has been vulnerable to blame for its convoluted non-tariff barriers. But, after this case, the Japanese government has become much more stubborn in accepting its trading partners' claims concerning unjustified or unreasonable non-tariff barriers, at least administered by the government." While the author agrees with Ahn on the significance of the Film case on the thinking of Japanese trade officials, particularly in boosting its confidence in the multilateral trading system, it is questionable whether they have become more "stubborn" in accepting the claims of non-tariff barriers by its trading partners.
Further study will be needed to answer the point raised by Ahn.
One other noteworthy characteristic regarding cases involving Japan as respondent is that complaints against Japan were frequent until around October 1998. Since then, only one Japanese measure (Apples, WT/DS245) has been challenged. Ahn (2003) suggests that this may have to do with the changing nature of Japan's trade barriers. He argues (p. 14): "[A]fter somewhat intensive probing by other WTO Members in the early WTO years, systemic or legal inconsistency of domestic policy measures or legal systems were mostly addressed and modified to comply with the WTO disciplines. There remain, therefore, few systemic problems to be addressed at least in terms of the current WTO disciplines." On the other hand, it is known that across the WTO membership in general there was a large increase in the number of complaints filed over the first three years of the WTO, with a decrease over the next couple of years. Over the last few years, as Leitner and Lester (2000, p. 170) note, the number of complaints has remained fairly steady. The number of cases against Japan may be simply following this general trend.
The uniqueness of Japan's attitude toward the WTO dispute settlement is highlighted by a comparison with Korea. Ahn (2003, p. 15) has observed that "Under the WTO system, the Korean government changed a dispute aversion attitude and has become considerably more active in asserting its rights through the dispute settlement mechanism." As shown in Table 1 All in all, Korea seems to be more aggressive than Japan in dealing with WTO disputes, let alone those countries with more complaints than Japan -Canada, Brazil, India and Mexico as shown in Table 1 . It is no surprise that METI trade officials seem to think that Japan's -16 -aggressiveness has more room for improvement.
NOT-SO-AGGRESSIVE LEGALISM?
Does the analysis above mean that Pekkanen (2001, p. 732 ) was wrong when she concluded, "Japan's aggressive legalism is here to stay"? The author does not believe so.
Japan's aggressive legalism must be understood in the historical context. For a long period of time, Japan was viewed in the GATT as a supporter of a less legalistic approach to dispute settlement, preferring a system of relying on negotiation and compromise instead of import restrictions on certain agricultural products to be in violation of GATT Article XI:1.
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Finally, a panel report submitted in March 1988 found that Japan's export restraint under the Japan-US Semiconductor Agreement was a violation of GATT Article XI:1. 14 Under such circumstances, Japanese government officials apparently felt that Japan too should assert its rights when it had a good case under the GATT.
15
There were two other factors that helped Japan in challenging the EC in the Parts and Components case. Japanese trade officials had become accustomed to the GATT panel procedures through preparing defenses in the cases brought against Japan. Also, by this time, complaints by other contracting parties were filed with the GATT in a more businesslike manner, decreasing the level of psychological barriers for Japanese trade officials.
Once victory in the Parts and Components case was confirmed, the trend towards aggressive legalism became irreversible. 16 MITI started publishing its annual report on the GATT consistency of Japan's major trading partners in 1992. 17 The report, which in Japanese 15 Iwasasa (2000, p. 477) .
16 According to a memoir by a former MITI vice minister for international affairs, the exact timing of this policy change can be pinpointed to a specific date, 10 April 1991, when the MITI officially announced the policy of upholding and utilizing international economic rules in a briefing paper submitted to the Administrative Reform
Council. See Hatakeyama (1996, p. 287) . 17 The report has been published annually ever since. The report is authored by a subcommittee of experts in the Industrial Structure Council, an advisory organ to the METI (MITI until 2001) Minister. However, since the secretariat function of the subcommittee is performed by the WTO department of METI and the publication of the carries a more blatant title of Fukosei boeki hokokusho ("Unfair Trade Policies Report"), was intended to be a Japanese answer to the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR)'s "National Trade
Estimates" (NTE) report. From the very beginning, the MITI report has been very critical of the aggressive unilateralism of the United States. From MITI's standpoint, while the NTE report simply catalogues complaints by the domestic industry, the MITI report was more objective, using the GATT rules as the benchmark for selecting objectionable trade policies and practices. "The very first complaint by Japan to the WTO … indeed provided the Japanese government with profound confidence in the new system. Right after the WTO began its work in 1995, the United States threatened the unilateral retaliation on Japanese automobiles under Section 301. Instead of undertaking 'negotiations' as previously done, the Japanese government resorted to the WTO dispute settlement system by challenging the Section 301 measures. The United States finally withdrew the Section 301 threat and both parties notified the settlement of the dispute to the WTO on July 19, 1995. The outcome of this case forcefully illustrated the effectiveness and usefulness of the WTO dispute settlement system report is authorized by METI bureaucracy, the report strongly reflects METI's view on multilateral trade policy.
as opposed to unilateralism."
19
Japan's aggressive legalism in this historical context is still alive and well. Compared to the past practices in the 1950s through the mid-1980s, Japan has come a long way toward establishing its aggressive trade strategy in the multilateral trading system. Furthermore, Japan's aggressive legalism has had a public relations dimension as well. As noted above, METI's
Fukosei Boeki Hokokusho has consistently emphasized the importance of a legal approach to trade disputes since 1992.
Aggressive legalism (although a softer expression like "trade policy based on international rules" is usually preferred) has been one of the publicly stated objectives of MITI/METI's policy. After the Section 301 (Automobiles) case was settled in Japan's favor, MITI triumphantly published a collection of position papers and texts of the final agreements.
20
Clearly, MITI was trying to appeal to the public about the legitimacy and desirability of the new trade policy. Aggressive legalism has consequently been regarded as an important policy tool for managing the bilateral trade relationship between Japan and the United States.
But there is a problem in that there appears to be certain disconnect between the publicly stated goal and the actual performance by the Japanese government. If Japan was only moderately aggressive in the use of the WTO dispute settlement process as we have seen above, would it be possible to sustain the energy and devotion toward the multilateral dispute settlement process under the current environment of excessive enthusiasm toward regional trade 19 Another case brought by the EC in 1998 on Section 301 (WT/DS152) confirmed the supremacy of multilateralism over unilateralism. As a result, the U.S. government has learned that any Section 301 retaliation will be a target of countersuit at the WTO and has decided to route most of the Section 301 cases through the WTO. The
United States is also committed to follow the rules of the DSU in the implementation/compliance phase of a dispute.
See Iida (2004, p. 216) .
20 MITI (1997) . This unusual publication has a photo of then MITI minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and the USTR agreements? As early as 2001, Pekkanen already pointed to the potential danger of regionalism.
Her conclusion was optimistic. She said (pp. 733-734):
"[T]his move toward regional pacts does not constitute an about-face with respect to Japan's keen interest in using the legal rules of the WTO to its advantage in trade disputes with the rest of the world. In fact, for the foreseeable future, it is a safe bet that Japan will continue to channel its dispute with partners like the US, EC, Canada, and perhaps even China in the near future, through the WTO system as much as possible. This is because, given the checkered and volatile bilateral past with the US, Japan's ability to be able to influence its partners' behavior depends heavily on sustaining the legal validity of its claims in the WTO system.
Stripped of the procedural, substantive, and legitimate weight of the WTO rules, While these are valid points that merit serious consideration, there are other institutional reasons that might be inhibiting the aggressive use of WTO rules by the private sector in Japan.
One reason is the lack of national complaint procedure. The METI report is conveniently silent on this issue. It is true that following the publication of the report, the Multilateral Trade System Department of METI has opened an "inquiry point" for compliance with WTO rules by Japan's trading partners on its Website, 23 but it is an informal mechanism administered by one government agency, not a national complaint procedure. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, I have traced the evolution of Japan's aggressive legalism in the course of the development of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. The drastic change in Japan's trade policy position in the early 1990s, i.e., the departure from the traditional non-legal spproach and the embracing of aggressive legalism, was a dramatic event both for Japan and its major trading -25 -partners. In hindsight, the Japan-U.S. automobile dispute in the summer of 1995 (WT/DS6) was probably the climax, symbolizing the new direction of Japan's trade policy. Thereafter, with the prolonged recession in Japan and the rise of economic powers in other parts of the world, bilateral disputes between Japan and the United States started to fade away from the major trade agenda.
Thus, while METI consistently emphasized the importance of rules-based trade policy, Japan's activity in the WTO dispute settlement system remained relatively moderate, casting doubt on the validity of the original assumption of Japan's aggressive legalism. However, Japan is far more aggressive than in the past in utilizing the rules of the GATT/WTO to advance its national interests. It will never revert to the earlier practice of bilateralism and gray area measures.
It is true that Japan came close to openly demanding gray area measures from China in the mushroom-onion-tatami dispute of 2001, 27 but that was an isolated incident with a country that was not yet a member of the WTO. If a similar dispute arises between Japan and China in the future, both countries as responsible WTO members will have to act more within the formal legal procedures. Indeed, as Pekkanen (2001, p. 734) notes, aggressive legalism is a double-edged sword. If Japan asks its trading partners to play by the rules, then it must accept the principle of fair play. Thus, Japan will continue to uphold the integrity of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, which is the "central element in providing security and predictability in the multilateral trading system" (Article 3.2, DSU). "How aggressively?" is a question that remains to be answered.
